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Abstract: Many consumers and clinicians incorrectly believe that the Food and Drug 
  Administration (FDA) approval of a new therapeutic implies that its benefits have been proven 
to exceed its harms. While the FDA could require proof that benefits exceed harms prior to 
approval, it has been argued that this approach would be infeasible because of prohibitively 
large sample sizes. One possible alternative would be for the FDA to supplement its standard 
“label”   denoting “safe and effective” with a secondary “label” denoting benefits have been 
demonstrated to exceed harms, which would be granted only after sufficient post-marketing 
data had accumulated to prove that its benefits exceeded its harms. This secondary label would 
not necessarily be linked to marketing restrictions or other commercial prohibitions but, rather, 
would be only information for consumers and clinicians. Strengths, weaknesses, and feasibility 
challenges of this approach are discussed.
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Introduction
Many consumers may believe that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval 
of a new therapeutic implies that its benefits have been proven to exceed its harms. 
Indeed, the FDA’s “For Consumers” website encourages precisely that interpretation, 
stating “[i]f FDA grants an approval, it means the agency has determined that the 
benefits of the product outweigh the risks for the intended use.”1 Arguably, much of the 
backlash directed at the FDA after the withdrawal of over 12 high-profile brand-name 
drugs (eg, rofecoxib, troglitazone)2–5 originated because consumers interpreted these 
withdrawals as proof that a presumptive judgment about benefits exceeding harms was 
inaccurate and premature.6 However, it is well documented that FDA approval does not 
indicate proof that benefits exceed harms.7 A marginally effective but “safe” drug may 
still have harms that exceed its benefits and, conversely, an unequivocally effective but 
“unsafe” drug may have benefits that exceed its harms. Magnifying confusion about 
these two distinct ideas, the FDA considers available information about benefit–risk 
balance at the same time that it assesses safety and efficacy for approval decisions, 
although risk/benefit information is applied implicitly and unsystematically rather 
than explicitly, systematically, and quantitatively.8,9 Consequently, the FDA does not 
require “proof” that benefits exceed harms, whereas it does require proof of safety 
and effectiveness.
While it can be argued that the FDA should make proof that benefits exceed harms 





infrequent events sometimes requires huge sample sizes 
that are impractical for pre-marketing studies. However, an 
alternative approach to make benefit/harm assessment more 
explicit could be to create a new label that would be conferred 
only after sufficient evidence has accumulated to prove that 
benefits exceed harms.
A new label for “benefits exceed 
harms”?
The FDA could supplement its standard label denoting 
safety and efficacy with a secondary label denoting benefits 
exceeding harms. Unlike the “safe and effective” label, this 
secondary “benefits exceed harms” label would not neces-
sarily be linked to marketing restrictions or other commercial 
prohibitions but, rather, would be only information for con-
sumers and clinicians, and could be harmonized with other 
approaches, such as the “drug box,” to make drug information 
more transparent to consumers.10 Because this secondary 
label would evaluate a concept with immediate relevance for 
decision making rather than the more abstract and context-
dependent idea of “safety,”8 it could lead to more informed 
shared decision making for consumers and physicians.
Determining whether benefits 
exceed harms
There are many systematic frameworks for quantitatively 
estimating whether benefits exceed harms6–9 (benefit–risk 
assessment [BRA]). While the purpose of this paper is not to 
systematically review BRA frameworks or to advocate using 
one framework over another, I will choose one particular 
BRA approach, Incremental Net Health Benefit (INHB), for 
illustration.7 This approach quantitatively compares benefits 
and harms on the same scale, and explicitly considers the 
idea that regulators or consumers may be risk averse (ie, 
weigh a harm more than they would weigh a benefit of equal 
  magnitude). (Briefly, the INHB of Therapy 2 versus Therapy 1 
can be expressed as INHB = (E2 - E1) - (R2 - R1), where 
effectiveness [E] and risk [R] are measured in the same 
units. A “favorable” benefit–risk balance occurs when 
(E2 - E1) . (R2 - R1) + X or (E2 - E1) . (R2 - R1) * X, 
where “X” is an additive or multiplicative factor that can 
reflect the risk aversion of regulators and can increase the 
mandated margin by which benefits exceed risks.)7
example
Suppose the FDA grants pre-marketing approval for a 
weight-loss drug based on pre-marketing studies that show 
clinically significant improvements in 20% of patients. 
Further, assume that the 20% improvement is a reason-
able approximation of the true biological effect. The pre-
  marketing studies did not suggest any serious adverse 
events, and the drug’s biological mechanism did not raise 
any concerns about particular harms. However, assume that 
the drug confers a true biological harm, life-threatening 
bleeding, in 0.2% of patients. This adverse event was too 
rare to be detected in the two pre-marketing studies, each 
of which enrolled 800 patients.
What data would be sufficient to determine that this drug 
has a favorable BRA? Regulators could use INHB to address 
this question by asking how many people would need to 
have the demonstrated incremental improvement in weight 
loss to offset one person having a serious adverse event from 
the drug. While one of the challenges of applying BRA to 
a new therapeutic is that the adverse event profile of a new 
therapeutic may be unknown, it is possible to test a plausible 
range of assumptions regarding the morbidity and mortality 
profile of hypothetical unknown adverse events, and to assess 
the sample size and/or follow-up necessary to have adequate 
statistical power to detect them.
For example, applying INHB with substantial risk 
  aversion might suggest that $100 persons would need to 
have clinically significant weight loss to offset one person 
having serious harm. Consequently, to evaluate the suitability 
of a “benefits exceed harms” label, regulators would need to 
determine whether sufficient data have accumulated to rule 
out an adverse event occurring at a corresponding   frequency 
(eg, in this case, at least 1/100 of the frequency of the 
anticipated benefit, or two events per 1000 patients). Using 
a standard power criterion of 80% and assuming a baseline 
frequency of one event per 1000 patients, this threshold 
would be attained after 12,340 patients have been studied. 
Therefore, this weight-loss drug could go on the market with 
FDA approval after the standard pre-marketing studies are 
concluded but would not receive a “benefits exceed harms” 
label until data have accumulated on at least 12,340 patients 
and until these data are investigated for unanticipated harm 
signals (Table 1).
It is important to note that while the “safe and effective” 
label would generally precede the “benefits exceed harms” 
label, this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, for a new 
therapeutic that confers a very large incremental benefit, the 
number of observations needed to demonstrate that benefits 
exceed harms would be small, and the “benefits exceed 
harms” label could be granted before the “safe and effective” 
label is granted (in this context, it could fill the role of the 
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Table 1 Suppose evidence is being evaluated regarding a weight loss drug that confers a clinically significant benefit in 20% of patients 
treated but yields a life-threatening harm in 0.2% of patients treated. Using Incremental Net Health Benefit to infer that one patient 
harmed would offset at least 100 patients benefitted and assuming that the harm has a baseline frequency of 0.1%, any study with 
an n between 186 and 12,340 would have sufficient power to detect the benefit, yet would have insufficient power to detect the 
harm. Consequently, a label designating proof that “benefits exceed harms” could only be justified based on data well beyond those 
demonstrating benefits or supporting regulatory approval
n (both arms) FDA approval? Sufficient power  
to detect benefit?
Sufficient power  
to detect harms?
Sufficient power to detect   
harms offsetting benefit?
n , 186 No No No No
186 # n , 1800 No Yes No No
1800 # n , 12,340 Yes Yes No No
n . 12,340 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Abbreviation: n, number.
Challenges to a new label for 
“benefits exceed harms”
BRA approaches in general, and the INHB method in par-
ticular, require embedded assumptions about what level 
of risk aversion is most suitable for a regulatory author-
ity, and about what level of statistical certitude should be 
required.7 For example, it may be argued that the standard 
criterion for null hypothesis testing in clinical studies 
(requiring P values , 5%) is too strict for disproving the 
analogous null hypothesis for BRA (ie, that benefits do not 
exceed harms), and therefore alternative criteria should be 
preferred.
It might be suggested that societal or regulatory prefer-
ences regarding BRA may differ greatly from individual 
patient preferences and risk tolerances and, therefore, it is 
neither possible nor desirable for regulatory authorities to 
attempt to make a particular BRA decision on behalf of 
  society.11 However, it is important to appreciate that analogous 
arguments may be made for most other regulatory activities. 
Individuals may have greatly differing definitions and evi-
dence standards for “safety” and “effectiveness,” for example, 
yet the FDA implicitly chooses a particular societal standard 
when it approves therapeutics. Indeed, one way to mitigate 
this concern is to make explicit in a “benefits exceeding 
harms” label that individual preferences, risks, and benefits 
vary; therefore, patients should make an individualized and 
shared decision with their clinician (Figure 1). For example, 
risk-tolerant patients may choose to try a new effective drug 
even before its benefits have been proven to exceed its harms, 
because they may be satisfied with a reasonable likelihood, 
rather than proof, that benefits exceed harms, particularly if 
they have a high symptom burden.
It may be appreciated that evaluations of incremental ben-
efits and harms will not be static, even without new evidence 
generation, because comparators may change over time as 
new alternatives become available and old alternatives are 
removed from the market. However, secondary labels can 
be revisited at suitable time intervals (eg, 5 years) that are 
used in other situations in which evidence reviews need to 
be updated, such as systematic reviews used for updating 
clinical guidelines.
Some may argue that backlash about withdrawn 
drugs has occurred because of unknown effects, and such 
effects would not have been included in a quantitative 
A
This therapy has been proven to be effective and relatively safe. However, it has not been
studied long enough to prove that its benefits exceed its harms for a typical person that this
therapy is approved for. Discuss your personalized risk of benefits and harms with your clinician.
B
This therapy has been studied long enough to prove that its benefits exceed its harms for a 
typical person that this therapy is approved for. However, every patient is different. Discuss
your personalized risk of benefits and harms with your clinician. 
Figure 1 Language that could be included as part of a post-marketing “benefits exceed harms” label. Prior to the issuing of this label ([A] possible lay explanation), data 
may have been consistent with benefits exceeding harms, but not robust enough to constitute proof. Issuing the “benefits exceed harms” label ([B] possible lay explanation) 
would designate that sufficient evidence had accumulated to allow detection of harms that could offset known benefits and, consequently, proof that benefits exceed harms. 
This is a far higher evidence standard for benefit–risk assessment than is currently required for marketing approval, and is more akin to the current evidence standard for 





benefit/harm analysis. However, this argument does not 
consider the idea that a quantitative benefit/harm analysis 
should only be performed after accumulation of evidence 
with sufficient statistical power to detect harms that would 
outweigh observed benefits. Backlash about unknown effects 
has generally occurred when drugs were approved before 
evidence accumulated with sufficient statistical power to 
detect those rare harmful events.
Finally, it may be questioned whether adding a second 
“benefits exceed harms” label would be preferable to clas-
sifying a newly marketed drug as “experimental” until suf-
ficient post-marketing data have accumulated to prove that 
benefits exceed harms. Indeed, expanding the use of the 
  “experimental” designation to all situations in which benefits 
have not yet been proven to exceed harms may accomplish 
the same goal. However, expanding the experimental desig-
nation in this manner would likely result in many new drugs 
coming to market labeled “experimental.” Such a sudden 
and sharp change in the use of a term currently associated 
with terminal illness could lead to substantial confusion. 
In contrast, adding a “benefits exceed harms” label could 
avoid this confusion and, indeed, may clarify the distinction 
between the separate criteria of “safe and effective” and 
“benefits exceed harms.”
Advantages of a new label for 
“benefits exceed harms”
Developing a second label for “benefits exceed harms” may 
lead to more informed decision making about “off-label” 
uses for therapeutics. For example, a therapeutic approved 
for Condition A may receive a “benefits exceed harms” label 
for Condition A, but still be used off-label for Condition B. 
While this off-label use may continue to be permitted, con-
sumers and clinicians would potentially be more aware that 
benefits have not been demonstrated to exceed harms for 
these off-label uses. Indeed, this growing awareness may 
lead manufacturers to seek “benefits exceed harms” labels 
for uses that had primarily been off-label and may encourage 
more circumspect utilization of new therapeutics beyond their 
approved indication.
It is possible that a “benefits exceeding harms” label 
would incentivize longer-term adverse-event monitoring 
and reporting by manufacturers of new therapeutics, as this 
longer-term follow-up would often be necessary to gener-
ate the additional evidence to establish that benefits exceed 
harms. Indeed, if the FDA adopted a “benefits exceeding 
harms” label, this may facilitate a more systematic assess-
ment of post-marketing data to look for harm signals.
Other considerations affecting 
a new label for “benefits exceed 
harms”
It is important to observe that absence of a “benefits exceed 
harms” label for a particular therapeutic need not preclude 
payers’ reimbursement for that therapeutic. Even when ben-
efits have not been demonstrated to exceed harms overall, 
benefits might be likely to exceed harms for a particular 
patient in a particular situation. However, payers may wish to 
require evidence of a shared decision between consumer and 
clinician that considers known benefits and harms (analogous 
to informed consent) before reimbursing therapeutics that do 
not have the “benefits exceeds harms” label.
Finally, it can be appreciated that circumstances in 
which additional evidence would be necessary to establish 
that benefits exceed harms are also circumstances where a 
formal analysis of expected value of information would sup-
port additional gathering of evidence, unless both benefits 
and risks are very small. In these circumstances, additional 
information would provide clearer inferences for decision 
making. Conversely, situations where benefits have been 
shown to exceed harms are situations in which the value of 
information will not support additional research because there 
is already a clear inference for decision making.11
Conclusion
If it is infeasible for the FDA to require proof that benefits 
exceed harms prior to marketing approval, it is worth ask-
ing whether the FDA should supplement its standard label 
denoting “safe and effective” with a secondary label denoting 
“benefits have been demonstrated to exceed harms.” Because 
this secondary label would evaluate a concept with more 
relevance for decision making than the abstract and context-
dependent idea of “safety,” it could lead to more informed 
shared decision making for consumers and physicians.
Disclosure
The author reports no conflicts of interest in this paper. No 
funding was received for this work.
References
1.  US Food and Drug Administration. Is it really FDA Approved?   February 
20, 2009. Available from: http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/Consum 
erUpdates/ucm047470.htm. Accessed Apr 5, 2011.
2.  O’Neill RT. A perspective on characterizing benefits and risks 
derived from clinical trials: can we do more? Drug Inf J. 2008;42(3): 
235–245.
3.  Roth-Cline MD. Clinical trials in the wake of Vioxx: requiring statisti-
cally extreme evidence of benefit to ensure the safety of new drugs. 
Circulation. 2006;113(18):2253–2259.Drug, Healthcare and Patient Safety
Publish your work in this journal
Submit your manuscript here: http://www.dovepress.com/drug-healthcare-and-patient-safety-journal
Drug, Healthcare and Patient Safety is an international, peer-reviewed 
open-access journal exploring patient safety issues in the healthcare 
continuum from diagnostic and screening interventions through to treat-
ment, drug therapy and surgery. The journal is characterized by the rapid 
reporting of reviews, original research, clinical, epidemiological and 
post-marketing surveillance studies, risk management, health literacy 
and educational programs across all areas of healthcare delivery. The 
manuscript management system is completely online and includes a very 
quick and fair peer-review system. Visit http://www.dovepress.com/ 
testimonials.php to read real quotes from published authors.





Should benefit–risk assessment have its own drug “label”?
4.  Avorn J. Evaluating drug effects in the post-Vioxx world: there must be 
a better way. Circulation. 2006;113(18):2173–2176.
5.  Furberg CD, Levin AA, Gross PA, Shapiro RS, Strom BL. The FDA 
and drug safety: a proposal for sweeping changes. Arch Intern Med. 
2006;166(18):1938–1942.
6.  Guo JJ, Pandey S, Doyle J, Bian B, Lis Y, Raisch DW. A review of 
quantitative risk-benefit methodologies for assessing drug safety and 
efficacy – report of the ISPOR risk-benefit management working group. 
Value Health. 2010;13(5):657–666.
7.  Garrison LP Jr, Towse A, Bresnahan BW. Assessing a structured, quan-
titative health outcomes approach to drug risk-benefit analysis. Health 
Aff (Millwood). 2007;26(3):684–695.
  8.  Garrison LP. Regulatory benefit-risk assessment and comparative 
effectiveness research: strangers, bedfellows, or strange bedfellows? 
Pharmacoeconomics. 2010;28(10):855–865.
  9.  Towse A. Net clinical benefit: the art and science of jointly estimat-
ing benefits and risks of medical treatment. Value Health. 2010; 
13(Suppl 1):S30–S32.
  10.  Schwartz LM, Woloshin S, Welch HG. Using a drug facts box to com-
municate drug benefits and harms: two randomized trials. Ann Intern 
Med. 2009;150(8):516–527.
  11.  Claxton K, Posnett J. An economic approach to clinical trial design and 
research priority-setting. Health Econ. 1996;5(6):513–524.